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The objective of this paper is to review the transmission mechanisms uniting equity market 
development and economic growth in developing countries. We find that the theoretical 
impact of equity markets is ambiguous. At the domestic level, the allocation function of 
equity markets appears conditioned by the extent of informational efficiency. Turning to 
international linkages, theoretical models suggest that equity market integration lowers the 
cost of capital, increases financial vulnerability and has a mixed impact on capital flows. 
Taking this into account, two conclusions arise. First, equity market development policies 
should focus on reaching and maintaining adequate levels of institutional transparency. 
Second, the optimal degree of international integration depends on the society’s preference 
between international accessibility and domestic stability.  
 
 
JEL classification: G11;G12;G15 














                                                 
1 Corresponding Author: lagoardt@tcd.ie.  Institute For International Integration Studies, School of Business, 
Trinity College, Dublin & CEFI, Universite Aix Marseille II.. 
2 PhD supervisor. School of Business Studies and Institute for International Integration Studies, Trinity College 
Dublin. 0.  Introduction 
Countries embarking on financial reforms usually bear two objectives in mind: (a) to raise the 
level of saving and investment; and (b) to improve the allocation of investment resources 
consistent with certain economic and social objectives. Endogenous growth models have 
suggested that financial development leads to an increased savings mobilization and a better 
allocation of capital (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga & Smith, 1991). In this 
view, financial liberalization is expected to raise the growth rate and improve living standards 
in developing countries (ADB, 1994). This mechanism has been confirmed by empirical 
studies which suggested a long-run relationship between financial liberalization, financial 
development and long-run growth (King & Levine, 1993; Levine & Zervos, 1998).  
However, these focused mainly on financial intermediation and the banking sector
1. By 
contrast, the theoretical and empirical literature on the implications of equity market 
development is scant. A number of economists have even suggested that the process has no 
impact on real activity (Stiglitz, 1989; Mayer, 1990). Sceptics argue that volatile equity 
markets constitute “costly irrelevances which (developing countries) can ill afford” (Singh, 
1999; Singh & Weiss, 1998). Another view is that development contributes to maximizing the 
allocation efficiency of investment by providing a specific bundle of financial services (Atje 
& Jovanovic, 1993). Equity markets and banking sector development may exert an 
independent but positive impact on economic growth (Levine & Zervos, 1998). Recent 
empirical work has indeed suggested that equity market liberalizations are associated with 
higher real growth, in the range of one percent per annum (Bekaert, Harvey & Lundblad, 
2001). Acknowledging the controversial nature of equity market development for economic 
growth in developing countries, the objective of this paper is to review the main theoretical 
causality mechanisms.  
                                                 
1 Bank loans constitute the primary source of outside funding for the corporate sector around the world.  For 
instance, in the U.S., banks provided about 62 percent of total outside finance for non-financial firms on average 
for the 1970-1998 periods, while stock issues accounted for only two percent (Hubbard, 2000) The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The first section investigates the welfare 
implication of domestic equity market development. Allocation efficiency appears to be the 
main transmission mechanism, and informational transparency is crucial. The second section 
focuses on the international integration of equity markets, and investigates its consequences 
based on an asset pricing definition. It appears that equity market integration lowers the cost 
of capital, increases financial vulnerability and has a mixed impact on capital flows.  Finally, 
the third section brings together our conclusions.   
 
1.  Equity market development 
1.1 Equity markets and allocative efficiency: the causality mechanism 
Initial models of ‘financial repression’ suggested that increased interest rates led to higher 
financial savings and greater capital allocation (McKinnon, 1973). However, these models 
were criticized for overlooking the possibility that endogenous constraints in the credit market 
constitute obstacles to the allocative efficiency of investment (Stiglitz&Weiss, 1981). 
Economists therefore considered equity market development to be a potential a solution to 
inefficiencies associated with weak credit markets in the presence of information 
asymmetries. For illustration, Cho’s (1986) seminal model supposes that banks and equity 
investors have the same level of information on firms. The information asymmetries 
hypothesis implies that individual borrowers can be sorted according to their expected 
productivities, but that their degrees of riskiness are unknown. Since banks cannot identify the 
individual risk characteristics of firms, they aggregate borrowers into groups, and base their 
decisions according to the expected variance in the distribution of riskiness for each group of 
borrowers. The banking sector expected return is thus a function of a fixed interest rate  * r  
and the default risk.  The model supposes that a group of firms j are innovative and highly 
productive while group of firms i have established customer relations with banks. Therefore, the bank’s subjective expected variance in the distribution of riskiness of group   should be 
larger than the other group i. As a consequence, the banks' expected return from lending to 
group   can be higher than that to group   (i.e., 
j
i j * * j E i E Π 〉 Π  ), although the expected 
productivity of the latter is higher than that of the former (i.e., Rj Ri〈 ).  This results in a 
suboptimal allocation of savings. 
Turning to equity markets, investors do not take default risk into account as their expected 
returns    are equivalent to the project’s expected return, i.e.  . Potential 
shareholders pick up their investment decisions based on comparison of expected 
productivities, which are known. This allows riskier groups (such as group j) to obtain 
financing. The model concludes that equity market development contributes to full capital 
allocation efficiency, especially in the presence of information assymetries in the credit 
market (Cho, 1986). Recent contributions have proposed intuitive refinements of this 
argument. For instance, institutional economists have highlighted that banking systems in 
developing countries are often characterized by a high ownership structure resulting in 
oligopolistic practices. In such systems, the selection of investment projects based on 
expected operating results can be disturbed by strategical political interactions between 
agents, which results in suboptimal investment decisions, and in a weak corporate sector. The 
poor allocative performance of the bank-based financial structure then magnifies the relative 
advantages of equity markets (Henry & Springborg, 2004). Other studies have underlined the 
liquidity–enhancing function of equity markets. The creation of a domestic stock market in 
developing countries may provide households with an additional instrument which may better 
meet their risk preferences and liquidity needs (Dailami&Atkin, 1990). Domestic stock 
investment may thus constitute an alternative to consumption, the purchase of land and real 
estate, or the seeking of more profitable investment abroad, ultimately resulting in a higher 
mobilization of savings (Oshiloya & Ogbu, 2003). Some have also underlined the role of a 
* j EΠ Rj j E = Π *large and active secondary market in mitigating the problem of the availability of long-term 
funds. Investors and corporations tend to have conflicting concerns over the optimal degree of 
liquidity of financial transactions. Investors favour high liquidity whereas corporations need 
to be assured of long term credits to match their long term assets. To reconcile these 
conflicting concerns, transactions in the secondary markets are necessary as they enable new 
issues in the primary markets to be successful. Equity market development therefore allows 
easing the tension between savers’ preference for liquidity and entrepreneurs’ need for long-
term finance (Ndikumana, 2001).  
Another line of reasoning, stemming from corporate finance theory, suggests that the 
development of securities market helps to strengthen corporate capital structure and 
governance. In countries where there are no viable equity markets, firms tend to rely heavily 
on internal finance and bank borrowings to finance fixed assets and working capital, which 
raises the debt/equity ratio. The resulting imbalanced capital structure increases interest rate 
risk by creating maturity mismatches on balance sheets. This weakens the corporate sector in 
periods of economic downturn, where banks tend to squeeze credit and limit overdraft lines. 
By contrast, efficient stock markets increase the viability of investment projects by allowing 
all firms to compare the cost of various sources of finance and to pick up the appropriate debt 
to equity mix (Oshiloya&Ogbu, 2003). Additionnally, equity markets may improve corporate 
governance by mitigating the issue of ‘moral hazard’. The latter is a standard corporate 
finance concept stating that the interests of managers and owners may not necessarily 
coincide if their incomes depend on different factors. In this context, inefficient managerial 
decisions may arise, negatively affecting the firm’s value. One advantage of the stock market 
is that it allows tying the manager’s income to stock prices, thereby reducing the incentive for 
imprudent actions and increasing the firm’s long term value. Equity markets can also improve managerial efficiency by promoting competition through effective takeover or threat of 
takeover (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
Overall, this analysis suggests that equity markets are useful as they enhance the economy’s 
allocative efficiency. However, the analysis becomes more complex when one incorporates 
information costs and the informational requirements it imposes on the individual equity 
investor ((Oshiloya&Ogbu, 2003). Just like credit markets, equity markets can be subject to 
informational constraints which may undermine their allocation function.  
 
1.2 The impact of market efficiency 
1.2.1 Definition 
At the theoretical level, ‘market efficiency’ states that the pricing of securities reflect all 
available information that is relevant to their valuation (Fama, 1970). However, within this 
unifying framework, ‘weak form’ efficiency has to be distinguished from other more 
restrictive definitions of efficiency, such as ‘strong’ and ‘semi-strong’ efficiencies. ‘Weak-
form’ efficiency states that asset prices reflect all past available information relevant to their 
valuation, so that the analysis of past prices cannot help predicting future patterns. ‘Semi-
strong form’ efficiency states that prices incorporate all public information as published in 
specialized press, financial statements and analysts’s reports. Finally, ‘strong form’ efficiency 
states that all public and private historical information is entirely reflected within asset prices, 
implying that even insiders are unable to achieve abnormal rates of returns by predicting 
future values. Nonetheless, rejection of the weak form of efficiency automatically implies 
rejection of the ‘semi strong’ and ‘strong’ forms. The weak form definition of market 
efficiency thus constitutes the main operational tool for theoretical and empirical studies 
(Mobarek & Keasey, 2000).  It implies that prices incorporate all known or anticipated events, 
and thus constitute an unbiased estimation of an asset’s intrinsic value. The main consequence of weak-form efficiency is that investors cannot predict future trends by extrapolating past 
events.  At an empirical level, this implies that the market follows a ‘random walk’ as only an 
unknown event may modify prices instantaneously. The latter property being straightforward 
to formalize, market efficiency is often defined based on time series econometrics. More 
precisely, efficient prices may be characterized by the following process (Barhoumi, 2005): 
 
t t t P P ε + = −1                                                                                                                              (1) 
  
Where Pt is the asset price at time t, Pt-1 is the asset price at time t-1 and εt is a randomly 
distributed variable with 0 mean and variance tσ
2. Assuming the absence of serial 
autocorrelation, we have: 
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According to (2), current prices constitute an appropriate expectation for the price in t+1. 
Besides, the variance of expected prices is given by: 
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As shown in (3), the variance of the expected price is equal to the variance of the random 
variable t ε . As a result, only the variance of the error term can explain the time-varying 
pattern of asset prices, whose changes do not help predicting future values. Hence, the evolution of market prices cannot be forecasted based on the analysis of past equity trends. 
Prices follow a random-walk, and the efficiency condition is respected.  
 
1.2.2 Implications 
(a)  Intuitive implications 
Under market efficiency, the ability of markets participants to identify the most productive 
investment opportunities based on actual price signals ensures that resources are efficiently 
utilized (Bekaert, Harvey & Lundblad, 2001). By contrast, informational inefficiencies disturb 
the market-based system of incentives, and ultimately the investment allocation process. First, 
a firm may not be able to raise the outside funds necessary to undertake a worthy investment 
project if manager cannot fully and credibly reveal information to outside investors and 
lenders (Myers and Majluf 1984). Second, assymetries of information between managers and 
outsiders may lead to diverging perceptions of asset pricing. Given the alternative of financial 
leverage, managers may issue new equity only if they assume that prices are overvalued. As a 
consequence, risk-averse investors may be reluctant to invest in new equity issues (Stiglitz, 
1989; Mayer 1990; Hubbard 2000). Entrepreneurs may also hesitate to implement public 
offerings as a result of high transaction costs or the uncertainty of getting a fair price, which 
reduces the incentive to enter new ventures (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997). Third, inefficient 
markets are often characterized by the absence of widely accepted accounting standards and 
the lack of a regular, adequate and reliable disclosure of information. This magnifies the 
informational advantage of insiders who are able to manipulate stock prices in order to make 
extra profits. For instance, better informed investors may gain inside information about firm 
productivity. This advantage may be used to retain the high-productivity firms and selling the 
low-productivity ones to partially-informed savers, resulting in a misallocation of domestic 
savings (Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1999)).  Fourth, market efficiency constrains the impact of stock market development on corporate governance. Tying the managers’ income to biased 
market prices would result in set of wrong managerial incentives, and ultimately introduce 
disturbances in the corporate governance mechanism (Pollin, 2002). Fifth, market cycles tend 
to be particularly pronounced in inefficient markets. A lack of reliable information favours 
noise and herding behaviours among investors, increasing the probability of sudden opinion 
reversals (Singh, 1997). The negative consequences of market volatility are well-known. The 
cost of capital to corporations may increase when due to market fluctuations which 
discourage risk-averse investors (Caporale, Howells&Soliman, 2004). Major booms and busts 
in the secondary market may also undermine the confidence of investors and affect the ability 
of companies to raise new funds in the primary market. A major crash in the equity market 
may also undermine the financial system as a whole and generate financial crises with very 
large economic and social costs (Agénor, 2003). Taken altogether, these intuitions constitute 
considerable backing for the idea that informational inefficiencies condition the equity 
market’s allocative performance.  
 
(b) Formal implications 
Theoreticians have begun to underline the crucial role of informational dynamics in 
determining the impact of stock market development on economic growth. A significant 
contribution was made in Capasso (2004). The author presented a dynamic general 
equilibrium model in which the firm level debt to equity ratio directly depends on the degree 
of informational asymmetry, which constitutes an obstacle to switching from debt financing 
to a less costly equity financing.  
Consider an economy in which capital is produced from risky investment projects whose 
expected returns vary according the characteristics of firms. There is a fraction   of 
skilled capital producers whose expected return is high, a fraction 
( 1 , 0 1 ∈ n )
() 1 , 0 2 ∈ n  of semi-skilled capital producers whose expected return is low, and a fraction 2 1 3 n n n − =  of unskilled capital 
producers whose expected return is zero. These capital producers have access to a safe capital 
project which yields a certain rate of return. Within each group, firms are heterogeneous 
according to their efficiency in running a project. The efficiencies of firms within the risky 
and safe project are indexed by α andβ , which are uniformly distributed on( . The initial 
outlay are 
) 1 , 0
() α a  and ( ) β a , respectively. Informational asymmetries stems from the fact that 
while efficiency levels α  and β are public knowledge, the type of firm is private information. 
Besides, type-1 firms produce units of capital with probability   and  units of capital with 
probability , type-2 firms produce   units of capital with probability 
1 k p 0
( p − 1 ) 2 k p  and   units of 
capital with probability (  such as
0
) p − 1 1 2 k k < ; and type-3 firms produce 0 units of capital. 
For a loan size of   and a linear production technology , a type-3 firm yields  w q ( ) [] q b w β −  
units of capital from running the safe project. Letting r  representing the equilibrium price of 
capital, the model assumes that: 
 
() 2 1 pk pa rpk > > α                                                                                                                   (1)                         
 
Consequently, households will never lend to type-2 and type-3 firms since they can always 
earn  () α pa  amounts of income by storage. It follows that these firms must masquerade as 
type-1 firms in order to receive loans to finance risky projects. Type-3 firms may or may not 
be motivated to do so depending on whether the returns from the risky projects are greater or 
less than the returns from the safe project. Letting * β  the fraction of type-3 firms who choose 
to run the safe projects and ( * 1 ) β −  be the fraction of type-3 who masquerade as type-1 
firms, the probability that a firm applying for a loan is actually a type-1 firm is equal to: 
 () ( [ ) ] * 1 1 2 1 2 1
1
β − − − + +
=
n n n n
n
Zt                                                                                           (2) 
 
t Z  represents the degree of information transparency in the equity market. An increase in 
( * 1 ) β − , the proportion of type-3 firms who masquerade as type-1 firms, results in lower 
values of  , and thus in higher information asymetries.  The expected market value of a 
risky project can then be defined as: 
t Z
 
() 2 1 1 npk z zpk EMV − + =                                                                                                      (3) 
 







=  represents the proportion of non-type 1 firms that are type 2. In 
the capital market, firms have the choice between two types of contract: a debt contract, in 
which repayment d is a lump sum from the proceeds of the project, and a equity contract in 
which repayment s is proportional to the net profits from the projects. Under both 
arrangements, the lender’s constraint is that the expected income from participation must be at 
least equal to  () α pa ,  the amount obtained from storage.  Taking this into account, the 
shareholder’s expected outcome when financing a risky project is equivalent to . 
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Assuming   to represent output production, the firm’s expected net income from an equity 
contract can be given as 
Φ
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Turning to debt contracts, the bank’s expected outcome is   ( ) [ ] 2 1 npk z zpD r − + . Using the 
lender’s participation constraint, this is equivalent to: 
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With probability p , the firm is successful, repays the loan and retain control over output 
production . With probability( , the firm fails, goes bankrupt and produces a 
subsistence amount of home production 
Φ ) p − 1
φ .  The firm’s expected net income can thus be 
defined as  () ( ) φ p p D k rp VD − + Φ + − = 1 1 . By substitution, we have: 
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The optimal choice of contract for a type-1 firm can then be characterized by the function 
; that is, from (5) and (7):  VD VE V − = *
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α
                                                                    (8) 
An equity contract is chosen if  , while a debt contract is chosen if  0 > −VD VE 0 < −VD VE . 
For each level of efficiency  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α , it can be shown that   is a concave function in 
, with   and 
* V
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ z +∞ = → * lim 0V z ( )( ) 0 1 * lim 1 > − Φ − = → φ p V z .  As shown in Figure 1, the highest of the curves is the locus corresponding to 1 = α , and the 
lowest is the locus corresponding to 0 = α . Inspection of the figure shows that the proportions 
of firms which prefer one contract to the other change with the level of information 
transparency. The fact that the proportion of firms preferring equity to debt is more important 
for high levels of information asymetries is due to the construction of the asymetry 
variable . More interestingly, the figure shows that the number of equity contracts increases 
with informational transparency, as we move from   to  . This model thus highlights that 
informational dynamics play a central role in determining the contribution of equity markets 
to the financing of investment project. This also suggests that equity markets can be useful, 
but constitute be poor guides to investors in the presence of information asymmetries.  
t Z















 Figure 1: Informational asymetries and firms’ financial choices  
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Debt2.  Equity market integration  
The issue of the integration of equity markets into global finance and its relationship with 
economic development arised during the last two decades of significant flows of capital to 
emerging markets. However, the impact of financial globalization has often been analyzed 
within a macoeconomic framework, which has considered the financial sector as a whole. In 
what follows, we show that equity market integration has specific welfare implications which 
can be derived from an asset pricing perspective. 
2.1  Definition 
Within the generic definition, the integration of financial markets (credit, bond, money and 
equity markets) means that all potential market participants with the same characteristics (i) 
face a single set of rules when they decide to deal with financial instruments, (ii) have equal 
access to these financial instruments, and (iii) are treated equally when they are active in the 
market (Baele et.al (2004)). Turning to equity markets, integration means that cross-market 
arbitrage opportunities disappear (Gjersem, 2003). In such a situation, portfolios having the 
same payoffs tend to be priced equally regardless of their geographic origin (Frankel, 1994). 
This implies not only the absence of barriers to capital flows, but also that investors undertake 
capital transactions to eliminate arbitrage opportunities that arise (Fratzscher, 2002). The 
extent of cross-market integration is thus a positive function of the degree of comovement 
between investment returns. The process culminates into the law of one price (Kearney and 
Lucey, 2004). At a theoretical level, asset pricing models are useful for conceptualizing the 
integration of capital markets (Stulz, 1999). These models can be classified into three 
categories: segmented markets, integrated markets and mildly-segmented markets (Bekaert 
and Harvey, 1995).  
 
 2.1.1 Full market segmentation  
Full market segmentation can be theoretically analyzed using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) as developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In this framework, the relevant 
risk that investors face is the asset’s contribution to variance of a diversified portfolio within 
the domestic country, i.e the variance of the country portfolio. For any individual stock in the 
segmented stock market we have: 
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Where   is the required rate of return on firm i’s stock,   is the risk-free rate in the 
domestic market, 
() i R E f r
im β  is the beta coefficient of firm i with the domestic market portfolio, and 
 is the expected return on the domestic market. The aggregate risk premium can be 
decomposed as the product of the coefficient of relative risk-aversion 
( m R E )
( ) W γ  by the variance of 
the domestic market portfolio  .  m
2 σ ( ) m i R R COV ,  is the covariance between the individual 
stock and the domestic portfolio.  
 
2.1.2 Mild market segmentation 
The mild segmentation model was introduced by Errunza and Losq (1985). Mild 
segmentation occurs when government introduce one restriction to financial liberalization: 
while domestic investors are allowed to invest in the world market portfolio, foreign investors 
can only hold a subset of domestic equities. This situation can be represented using a hybrid 
CAPM in which assets are divided into freely tradable and restricted. Freely tradable assets 
are priced according to the world factor, which remains the relevant source of systematic risk for foreign investors. In other words, the pricing of investible securities under mild 
segmentation will continue to be given by:  ( ) ( ) [ ] f m im f i r R E r R E − + = β . By contrast, the 
pricing of non-investible securities includes a ‘super risk premium’, which compensates 
domestic investors for bearing the risk associated with holding all of the non investible stocks. 
For any individual restricted stock we have: 
 
() () ( )( ) ( ) I n i w i f i R R R COV W u R R COV W r R E , , γ γ + + =                                                      (2) 
 
In equation (2),  and  are the returns on the portfolio investible and non-investible 
securities, respectively. The variable 
n R I R
( ) I n i R R R COV ,  is the covariance of firm i’s return with 
the return on the portfolio of non-investible stocks, taking the return on the investible 
securities as given. γ and γu are the coefficient of risk aversion for restricted international 
investors and unrestricted domestic investors, respectively. 
                                                                        
2.1.3 Market integration 
The international version of the CAPM was proposed by Solnik (1974), in which risk is 
measured by asset contribution to the world portfolio. Under financial integration, the 
domestic equity market becomes part of the global equity market. As a consequence, 
domestic assets are rewarded in function of their covariance with the world portfolio, as the 
risk premium on any asset is proportional to its world beta. For any local firm, we thus have: 
() () [ ]
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 Where  iw β  denotes firm  ’s beta with the world market,  i ( ) w R E  denotes the required rate of 
return on the world equity market portfolio,   denotes the variance of the return of the 
world portfolio and the world risk-free rate. In other words, expected local returns
w
2 σ
* f r ( ) i R E  in 
a fully integrated market depend solely on non-diversifiable international factors. The extent 
of integration of capital markets into global finance has various economic and financial 
effects, which can be derived from an asset pricing model. These include a decrease in the 
cost of capital for local firms, a decrease in portfolio diversification opportunities, and an 
increase in financial vulnerability. 
 
2.2  Implications 
2.2.1  Market integration and the cost of capital 
The CAPM implies that the expected return required by the market on a risky security is equal 
to the risk free rate plus a risk premium equal to the beta coefficient of the security times the 
world market’s’s risk premium. In other words, the investment’s present value for the 
shareholders is equivalent to the expected cash flows discounted by their required rate of 
return, as determined by the CAPM. Therefore, a decrease in the market’s risk premium 
makes all projects which have a positive covariance with the market portfolio look more 
advantageous for investors. From the firm’s point of view, this is equivalent to a decrease in 
the cost of capital.  
The relationship was formally analyzed by Stulz (1999).  The model makes the assumption of 
a homogenous degree of risk aversion for investors. Consequently, the price per unit of risk is 







=                                                                                                                           (1) Asset pricing theory states that the expected return required by the market on a risky security 
is equal to the risk free rate, plus a risk premium equal to the beta coefficient of the security 
times the reference market’s risk premium. Assuming  ( ) m R E  to be the domestic market 
equilibrium rate of return and rm to be the domestic risk-free rate, we have: 
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σ ρσ , where   is the variance of the return in the global portfolio and 
2
w σ ρ is the 
correlation coefficient between the return of the small country portfolio and the world 
portfolio. In addition, risk premiums can be rewritten as the product of the variance times the 
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By substitution, the necessary and sufficient condition for financial integration to diminish the 
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According to (4), globalization decreases the risk premium – and thus the cost of capital - in 
the small country provided that return volatility of the small country portfolio relative to return volatility of the world portfolio is higher than the correlation coefficient between the 
small country market and the world markets. In other words, the small country risk premium 
decreases if an investor that has all his wealth invested in the small country can construct a 
lower variance portfolio by selling some of his assets in the small country and make a positive 
investment in the world market portfolio. By contrast, integration may increase the risk 
premium and the cost of capital if the covariance with the world market is too high. In this 
case, the small country market is risky relative to the world market and therefore requires a 
higher risk premium. The same phenomenon occurs if the volatility of the world market is 
much higher than the small market’s volatility. Therefore, a country that liberalizes its capital 
market can experience a decrease in the cost of capital provided that the correlation of its 
market portfolio with the world portfolio is not too large or if its volatility is larger than the 
volatility of the world market portfolio (Stulz, 1999). The impact of financial integration of 
capital markets on the cost of capital is thus strongly related to diversification opportunities 
arising from the integration process. Besides, this impact varies according to firm 
characteristics (Chari and Henry, 2004). This can be shown by subtracting equation (2) from 
equation (1): 
 
() () ( )( ) DIFCOV r r R E R E R E f f i i i γ + − = − = ∆ * *                                                                     (5) 
 
Where ()( ) [ w i m i R R Cov R R Cov DIFCOV , , − = ] . Equation (5) highlights the two channels 
through which integration may affect the firm-level required rate of return. The first effect 
occurs through a change in the risk-free rate and is common to all firms. The second effect is 
firm-specific and depends on the covariance of firm i’s stock return with the domestic market 
minus the covariance of firm  ’s stock return with the global market. Intuitively, two 
situations may arise. If firm i has a low beta with respect to the world market and a high beta 
iwith respect to the small country market, financial integration can lead to a substantial fall in 
the risk premium and in the cost of capital. By contrast, if firm  has a low beta with the small 
market portfolio and a high beta with the world market portfolio, and is small enough that it 
does not affect the distribution of the returns in the small market portfolio, financial 
globalization can increase the risk premium. However, such firms constitute exceptions in a 
domestic market. Overall, the model shows that financial integration has the potential to 
diminish the firm-level cost of capital, and thereby allow increasing the domestic rate of 
investment in capital-scarce economies.  
i
For illustration, Patro and Wald (2005) investigated a panel of 18 emerging markets and made 
three important observations. First, they found an average decrease in returns of 2.88% per 
month during the 36 month period starting three and a half year after the liberalization date, 
suggesting a decrease in the cost of capital. Second, they constructed asset pricing models and 
observed an average increase in global beta of 0.199 after liberalisation. As predicted by 
models of international asset pricing, this indicates that increased global risk sharing is the 
source of the perceived decline in the cost of capital. Third, they measured the extent to which 
risk sharing drives the revaluation of stock prices that actually occurs following liberalisation. 
To do so, they investigated the impact of firm-level characteristics and found that the decrease 
in the cost of capital is more pronounced for firms with a higher local market beta, which tend 
to display lower long term returns. The latter result echoes Chari and Henry (2004), who used 
a similar dataset in international asset pricing modeling framework, and found that firm-
specific risk sharing characteristics as measured by the differential between local and global 
covariances account for two fifth of the revaluation of investible stocks. Empirical studies 
hence highlight a decrease in the cost of capital in the period following financial 
liberalization, which seems to be related to firm level characteristics. The differential between local market and global betas thus appear to be driving the main theoretical advantage of 
equity market integration.  
 
2.1.2 Market integration and financial vulnerability 
The concept of financial contagion refers to a possible unexpected transmission of volatility 
across markets. There are several co-existing definitions for contagion, all highlighting the 
destabilization risk brought along by financial liberalization.  Fundamental contagion refers 
to the transmission of shocks resulting from real interdependencies between economies. Pure-
contagion is the transmission of local shocks to another country or market, resulting in an 
increase in correlation during periods of financial crisis in excess of fundamental linkages 
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Nonetheless, whatever the chosen definition, financial contagion 
refers to shocks in a market resulting from the international transmission of price movement 
(Kodres and Pritsker, 2001).  The linkage between market integration and this generic 
definition of contagion has been underlined by Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2003). Their 
approach proceeded by extending the traditional CAPM from a one-factor to a two-factor 
setting. In doing so, they divided the world market into the U.S. and a particular region, and 
allow for local factors to be priced. Consider a financially integrated country i. Under the 
CAPM, expected excess returns in US dollars have the following form: 
 
t i t REG t iREG t US t iUS t i i it Z R , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , * * ε µ β µ β γ + + + = − − − − −                                                             (1) 
 
In (1),  1 , − t US µ  and  1 , − t REG µ  represent the conditional expected excess returns on the US and 
regional portfolios, based on informations available in ( ) 1 − t . The vector   contains a 
constant and the local dividend yield, which help estimate the expected return of market i. 
1 , − t i ZThe sensitivity of equity market i to the foreign news factors is measured by the parameters 
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Where   represents the US market capitalisation relative to the world market 
capitalisation at time  .  ,   and   are information variables that 
capture the covariance risk of market iwith the US and the region, respectively
1 , − t US W
1 − t 1 , − t iUS X 1 , − t iREG X 1 , − t iW X
3.  t i, ε  
represents the unexpected portion of local market returns. It is driven not only by shocks from 
the local market, but also by two foreign shocks originating in the U.S. and the region, that is, 
 
t i t REG t iREG t US t iUS t i e e e , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , * * + + = − − − − β β ε                                                                            (3) 
 
Where   represents the idiosyncratic shock on any market i (including the US and world 
portfolio). It follows a normal distribution such as 
t i e ,
( ) it t i N e 2 , 0 ~ , σ . The U.S. and regional 
markets models are special cases of (1)-(2). For the U.S. market (with i  =  us  ), 
. For the regional market, (with i = reg ),  . US and 
regional dollar excess returns can thus be expressed as: 
0 , 2 , 1 = = = US US US q p p 0 , 2 = = REG REG q p
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3 In the empirical model, these include the proportions of bilateral trade (Xus+Mus)/E(X+M), 
(Xreg+Mreg)/E(X+M) and (X+M)/GDP, respectively.  
And the unexpected US and regional returns are : 
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Letting   and  be two individual countries and assuming that the idiosyncratic shocks to the 
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The conditional covariance dynamics given in (6) have several important implications. First, a 
market’s covariance with the U.S. (regional) market return is positively related to its country-
specific beta with the U.S. (or region). Second, provided that the country specific beta 
parameter is positive, higher volatility in the U.S. market induces higher return covariance 
between the U.S. and market i. Third, the covariance with the regional market or any other 
national market j within the same region increases in times of high return volatility in the U.S. 
and/or the regional market. This natural implication of any factor model, coupled with 
asymmetric volatility, could lead to the appearance of “contagious bear markets.” The 
significant costs associated to this phenomenon have been underlined by a well-known series 
of financial crises which had various causes but which spreaded worldwide equivalently. 
These included the Mexican peso crisis of December 1994, the Asian crisis of 1997, the 
Russian crisis of August 1998, the collapse of the Brazilian real in January 1999, the Turkish lira crisis of February 2001, and the Argentine peso crisis of December 2001-January 2002. 
For instance, Bekaert, Harvey and Ng. (2003) highlighted that correlation increased 
significantly during the Asian crisis, so that even countries whose economic fundamentals 
(deficits, inflation, and unemployment rate) were not degraded were affected by contagious 
waves of bear markets. Theory and evidence hence suggest that increased financial 
vulnerability is an unavoidable cost of market integration. 
 
2.1.3  Portfolio rebalancing and capital flows 
Standard portfolio theory states that the inclusion of weakly correlated assets into a domestic 
portfolio reduces risk and maximize long run yields (Markowitz, 1952,1959). Concurrently, 
the additional benefits of international diversification have been highlighted by Grubel (1968) 
and Solnik (1974). In theory, these benefits are attributed to smaller correlation between 
international assets, as compared to assets belonging to the same market. According to Roll 
(1992) this differential can be explained by differences in cross-national industrial structures. 
Intuitively, the benefits of international diversification thus depend on the degree of market 
integration/segmentation. In an international context where many emerging countries 
dismantled restrictions and controls on capital flows and at the same time relaxed regulations 
on the operation of domestic financial markets and moved away from regimes of ‘financial 
repression’, the consequence has been the increased globalization of investments seeking 
higher rates of return and the opportunity to diversify portfolio risk. 
Financial liberalization and deregulation policies have eased the implementation of 
diversification strategies by allowing international capital movements, leading to an increase 
in global portfolio investment flows. However, integration brings along an increase in 
international cross-market correlations, which hinders the benefits of international 
diversification. The relationship between integration, correlation and diversification is formally illustrated in Arouri (2003).  First consider the following International Asset Pricing 
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δ  is the time-varying price of market covariance risk. 
Therefore, the risk premium is expressed as the product of the price of risk  1 − t δ  and the actual 
risk . Besides, according to the ‘separation theorem’, investors derive 
optimum portfolios by combining the market portfolio and the risk free rate (Black, 1972). 
Let I be the internationally diversified portfolio. We thus have: 
( 1 / , − Ωt w i R R COV )
 
() ft t t w t I R R R 1 , 1 1 * − − − + = θ θ                                                                                                      (2) 
 
According to (2), the returns of the international portfolio can be decomposed into the risk-
free rate and the market portfolio. The exact decomposition of returns depends on 1 − t θ , which 
represents the investor’s preference for international investment. The latter is a positive 
function of the expected domestic risk, and a negative function of the expected global 
















θ                                                                                                                (3) 
 
Excess returns of the international portfolio can thus be given by:  
() ( ) 1 , 1 1 1 / , * / − − − − Ω = − Ω t w t w t t f t I R R COV r R E θ δ  
() (1 1 1 1 / * * / − − − − ) Ω = − Ω t wt t t f t I R VAR r R E θ δ                                                                           (4) 
                        
Letting   be the domestic portfolio, domestic excess returns can be expressed as follows:  i
 
() ( 1 1 1 / , * / − − − ) Ω = − Ω t w i t f t i R R COV r R E δ                                                                               (5) 
 
It follows that the expected gains from international diversification are equal to: 
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Considering the conditional correlation coefficient between the domestic and the global 
portfolio  ()
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And by substitution: 
() ( ) ( ) 1 , 1 , , 1 1 * 1 * / − − − − Ω − = Ω − t t i t w i T T i I R VAR p R R E δ                                                           (8)                              
 According to (8), the gains from international diversification are a negative function of the 
conditional correlation coefficient between the domestic portfolio and the global portfolio. 
The power of portfolio diversification is magnified in segmented markets, where returns tend 
to be predominantly determined by the systematic risk of each security in the context of the 
national portfolio (Bartram & Dunfey, 2001). By contrast, the gains from international 
diversification are equal to zero under perfect integration; ie when the domestic portfolio is 
perfectly positively correlated to the global portfolio (piw,t-1=1). Taking this into account, 
equity market liberalization may have a mixed impact on portfolio inflows. Market 
segmentation may first lead to a sharp increase in capital flows in the immediate aftermath of 
financial liberalization. As an illustration, Bekaert & Harvey (2000) investigated a sample of 
16 emerging markets and observed that american holdings increased on average from 6.2% to 
9.4% of market capitalization from five years before liberalization to five years after 
liberalization. Empirical studies have suggested that these capital flows are self-sustained on 
the short run due to the induced pressure on local prices which results in significant ‘returns to 
integration’ (Bohn&Tesar, 1996; Clark&Berko, 1997). However, the subsequent increase in 
international correlation leads to dynamic rebalancing of international portfolios, ultimately 
resulting in the adjustment of capital inflows (Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2000; Stulz 1999; 
Griffin, Nardari&Stulz, 2002). This phenomenon is illustrated in figure 2, which shows an 
increase in capital flows between in the time between liberalization and integration, and a 
diminution of the same flows in the following years (Barhoumi, 2005). 
Overall, theoretical models suggest that financial integration diminishes the cost of capital, 
increases financial vulnerability and has a mixed impact on capital flows. From an economic 
perspective, equity market integration seems to depend on an arbitrage between international 
accessibility and domestic stability.  
 Figure 2. Market integration and portfolio flows 
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 3. Conclusion 
Two salient facts have emerged from this literature survey. First, the impact of equity market 
development on the allocation of investment seems to be determined by the extent of 
informational transparency (Bekaert & Harvey, 2001, Capasso, 2004). Second, the integration 
of local equity markets into global finance appears to have mixed consequences. Asset pricing 
models underline a diminution of the risk-premium following integration, resulting in a lower 
cost of capital for local businesses (Stulz, 1999). But on the other hand, increases in 
international covariances exert a positive impact on financial vulnerability. Financial 
integration may increase shock sensitivity and financial contagion (Bekaert, Harvey & Ng, 
2003). Increases in international correlations also undermine the benefits of portfolio 
diversification for foreign investors, resulting in a mixed impact on capital flows (Arouri, 
2001; Baroumi, 2005). The overall policy message is thus ambiguous. Theory shows that the 
effectiveness of policies seeking to enhance the allocative function of equity markets is 
conditioned by the extent of informational efficiency. We can hence suggest that equity 
market development policies should focus on reaching and maintaining adequate levels of 
institutional transparency, regardless of the level of international integration, which depends 
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